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Abstract
Perseveration is a well-replicated finding in autism. The aim of this study was to examine
how the context of the task influences performance with respect to this phenomenon. We
randomly assigned 137 children aged 6–12 with and without autism to complete a modified
card-sorting task under one of two conditions: Children were either told the sorting rules on
each trial (Explicit), or were given feedback to formulate the rules themselves (Implicit).
While performance was enhanced on the Explicit condition for participants without autism,
the participants with autism were disadvantaged by this manipulation. In contrast, there
were few differences in performance between groups on the Implicit condition. Exploratory
analyses were used to examine this unexpected result; increased autism symptomology
was associated with poorer performance.
Introduction
Errors committed by participants with autism on executive function tasks such as the Wiscon-
sin Card Sort Test (WCST;[1]) are said to reflect cognitive inflexibility; participants become
stuck in set, such that once a response set or strategy is established participants cannot abandon
that for a new strategy and instead persevere with the old strategy despite the fact it is no longer
effective. The aim of the following study was to further investigate this phenomenon in the
context of developmental psychology, by examining performance relative to the typical devel-
opmental trajectory of cognitive flexibility. Namely, while the perseverative errors committed
by individuals with autism on the WCST resemble the response patterns of adults with frontal
lobe damage, they also resemble the response patterns of 3-year-old typically developing chil-
dren[2, 3]. We experimentally manipulated the WCST, drawing also from its pre-school ana-
logue task, the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) [4], administered under two sets of
conditions, in order to further understanding of perseverative behaviour in autism.
Cognitive flexibility and executive function in autism
A range of assertions have been made with respect to whether and which aspects of executive
functions are intact or impaired in persons with autism, depending on the tasks used to mea-
sure particular sub-skills [5–11]. The WCST [1] is one of the most widely used tests of execu-
tive function, broadly defined, with a range of outcome measures representing different
aspects of performance [2]. The task consists of four target cards that differ on three dimensions
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(colour, shape, and number). Participants are given test cards that vary along the same dimen-
sions and are asked to place the test card with the target card that is the best match. Participants
are told only whether their choice was correct or incorrect, and must then infer the sorting rule
according to this feedback. After ten correct responses, the sorting rule is changed without
notice to the participant, who must then deduce the new rule. This test is classed as a test of
“cognitive flexibility” or “attentional set-shifting” because of the changing rules. It has been
used extensively with persons with autism, revealing they complete fewer categories and com-
mit more perseverative errors than matched control groups [12–19] (but see [20–22] for notable
exceptions). Due to the complex nature of the task, however, the source of error is unclear.
On the WCST, three types of error are often measured: failure to maintain set (FMS), per-
severative error, and non-perseverative / random error. An FMS error occurs when the partici-
pant changes response strategies despite the rule remaining the same. This type of error is
regarded as attentional [23]. Perseverative error occurs when the participant continues with
the same response strategy following a rule switch. This type of error is regarded as a failure to
inhibit a prepotent response. Non-perseverative errors are generally considered to be random.
Both perseverative and non-perseverative errors are considered to reflect executive dysfunc-
tion [23]. Non-perseverative error rates are not reported as frequently as perseverative error
rates, but it seems persons with autism commit both types of error more often than compari-
son groups [18, 24], while the proportion of total errors classified as perseverative does not
differ between groups. In a recent meta-analysis, Landry and Al-Taie [2] concluded that per-
severative, non-perseverative, and FMS errors occur more often in individuals with autism,
and that there is no evidence that individuals with autism perform better on the WCST when
the task is administered on a computer.
The WCST is a complex task, and it may be an oversimplification to state that flexibility
underlies errors committed by individuals with autism on the task. For example, the Intra-
dimensional/Extra-dimensional shift test (ID/ED) test contains nine levels of increasing com-
plexity (see Hughes, Russell, & Robbins [5] for complete description). On this task, children,
adolescents, and adults with autism demonstrated flexibility on the first seven levels, which
included simple reversals, compound reversals, and intra-dimensional shifts and reversals, and
were inconsistently reported impaired on the extra-dimensional shift, when the requirement
was to attend to the previously irrelevant dimension [5, 6]. Like the WCST, the ID/ED task
requires participants to figure out the rule on the basis of feedback, when the rule changes after
a certain criterion of correct responses is attained. The ID/ED task therefore also provides evi-
dence against the argument that participants with autism are insensitive to feedback, as partici-
pants were successful in switching response rules following feedback. The ID/ED task is
different from a card-sorting task in that participants learn to respond to one of a pair of sti-
muli, rather than sort stimuli into categories. Participants with autism demonstrated flexibility
on the ID/ED conditions up to and including novel exemplars and reversal within the same
basic higher-order rule, when discrimination is based on shape. Participants with autism from
ages 7 through 47 ran into difficulty when the higher-order rule changed (ignore shape) and a
previously irrelevant dimension of the stimuli became the basis for the rule [5, 11].
In summary, participants with autism are prone to a specifically “stuck-in-set persevera-
tion” [5] that is not accounted for by insensitivity to feedback. Another task in which higher-
order rules change and the previously irrelevant dimension of the stimuli becomes the basis
for the rule is the DCCS. The DCCS [25] was created as an analogue of the WCST for young
children, and contains only two targets and two potential sorting strategies. Further, on the
DCCS, children are told how to sort the cards on every trial and very explicitly told when the
sorting strategy changes. Despite the explicit provision of sorting rules, 3-year-olds are persev-
erative and inflexible. When 5-year-olds are provided with the sorting rules, however, they
Rule use in autism
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160 January 13, 2021 2 / 19
very reliably switch sorting strategies on the DCCS [26], yet commit higher rates of persevera-
tive and non-perseverative errors on the WCST compared with 12 year olds [27]. Persevera-
tion on the DCCS and perseveration on the WCST are thus developmentally different forms of
cognitive inflexibility. To date, limited research has examined perseverative behaviour in
autism within this context.
Children with autism demonstrated less flexible performance on the DCCS relative to typi-
cally developing children on manual card versions [28] and computerized versions [29, 30].
Preliminary evidence suggested children with autism performed similarly to verbal mental age
matched typically developing children on the DCCS [31]. Data reported by Zelazo, Jacques,
Burack, & Frye [32] also suggests simple switching behaviour is verbal mental age appropriate
in autism. Zelazo et al. [32] tested participants with autism on two tasks designed to assess cog-
nitive flexibility in preschool aged children and provided participants with autism a composite
score reflecting performance across the two tasks, one of which was the DCCS. Scores could
range from 0–4 with a maximum score of 2 on each task indicating successful switching; indi-
viduals scoring 4 thus exhibited switching on both tasks, and individuals scoring 3 must have
exhibited switching on one task but not the other. An examination of their data [32], indicates
that participants who were inflexible also predominantly had lower verbal mental ages, many
equivalent to 3 or 4 years old. Thus, on the DCCS, participants with autism were capable of a
level of cognitive flexibility that was commensurate with their developmental level.
Current study
There are two key differences between the DCCS and the WCST. First, they differ in the num-
ber of targets and potential sorting rules. Second, they differ in the instructions and feedback
given to participants. For the present investigation, we experimentally manipulated both of
these factors. The DCCS contains two target cards and allows two potential conflicting sorting
rules. The WCST contains four target cards and three potential conflicting sorting rules. We
bridged this gap by creating a card-sorting task with three levels. The first level, like the DCCS,
contains two target cards and two conflicting rules. The second level contains three target
cards and three conflicting rules. The third level, like the WCST, contains four target cards
and three conflicting rules. Unlike the adult WCST, we removed all ambiguous cards—cards
that can simultaneously match on more than one dimension. For example, a test card with two
blue triangles matches the target of four blue triangles both on colour and shape. This increases
the difficulty of the task as participants may receive correct feedback that is ambiguous with
respect to which rule is correct, colour or shape. We did not include any such ambiguous
cards; a given card could only match one dimension at a time. We administered the task to
children in one of two conditions. In the Explicit condition, like the DCCS, children were
explicitly told on each trial which rule to use to sort the cards. In the Implicit condition, like
the WCST, children were told that they had to figure out which rule to use on the basis of feed-
back. We tested the prediction that the Explicit condition would be easier than the Implicit
condition for all children. Further, we tested the prediction that children with autism would
perform differently to children without autism, when matched for developmental level.
Method
Participants
Participants included 42 children with prior autism diagnoses and 95 children without autism
(80 typically developing and 15 children with developmental delay), ages 6–15. Children were
recruited from mainstream public and special education schools in England and Wales. The
research was approved by the School of Psychology, University of Nottingham Research Ethics
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Board. The research was also approved by all participating schools. Written consent was
obtained from parents, while participants provided verbal assent. The children with autism
were recruited from special education schools and all had received a formal clinical diagnosis
prior to school entry according to DSM-IV [33] or ICD-10 [34] criteria, and as a result had a
statement of Special Educational Needs for an Autism Spectrum Disorder. Diagnostic criteria
was confirmed using an observational checklist based on the DSM-IV, and current sympto-
mology was quantified using the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; [35]). No partic-
ipants (with or without autism) had a diagnosis of ADHD according to parent and teacher
report. All 95 children without autism completed the experimental task. Of this group, 50 were
selected as best potential developmental matches for the participants with autism (including
35 typically developing children with chronological age distributions matched to the mental
age distribution of the participants with autism and all 15 children with developmental delay)
and completed the Weschler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI [36]) and the SCQ [35].
Parents completed the SCQ by mail with a 62% return rate; parents of children with autism
completed the Current Form to give a metric of current symptomology, while parents of chil-
dren without autism completed the Lifetime Form to screen for autism symptoms and give a
comparable lifetime metric of sub-clinical symptomology. The SCQ is a 40-item questionnaire
that parents can complete without supervision, responding “yes” or “no” to a series of state-
ments about their child. The items on the SCQ parallel the Autism Diagnostic Interview–
Revised [37]. The Lifetime Form asks if the child ever exhibited symptoms, with many ques-
tions focused on the critical period between ages 4 and 5, while the Current Form asks if the
child has exhibited the same symptoms in the past three months. Higher scores indicate the
presence of more symptoms of autism. The recommended cut-off score for the Lifetime Form
is 15, which gives a minimum of false negatives, while a cut-off score of 22 gives a minimum of
false positives. Discriminative validity is reported to be .86 overall, but is better for individuals
with average IQ and low IQ (.90) than for very low IQ (.79).
Four participants with autism were excluded because IQ testing was incomplete. Five par-
ticipants without autism were excluded for having SCQ scores� 22. Thus, 38 children with
autism and 45 children without autism (35 typically developing and 10 developmental delay)
were included in the analyses. Mann-Whitney U test was used to check for differences in
WASI raw performance between groups. Groups were matched on performance subscales of
the WASI (Block–U = 780, p = .49, Matrix–U = 775.5, p = .69) but differed significantly on ver-
bal subscales (Vocab–U = 578.5, p = .011, Similarities–U = 542, p = .009). Age, IQ, WASI
scores, mental age estimates, and SCQ scores are provided in Table 1. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to the Explicit or Implicit conditions and there were no significant differences
between conditions or interactions between condition and group on any of these measures.
Stimuli
The target stimuli and test cards were printed on A6 laminated card stock using an ink-jet
printer. The target cards were affixed to trays placed in front of the participants on a table. The
target cards for the two-target level included a red star and a yellow square (Fig 1). The target
cards for the three-target level included one red star, two yellow squares, and three green cir-
cles (Fig 2). To these, four blue triangles were added for the four-target level (Fig 2). A com-
plete list of test cards is given in S1 File.
Procedure
The participants were randomly assigned to either the Explicit or Implicit condition. All test-
ing occurred in the participants’ schools (in a resource room or library). The participants were
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introduced to the task as a special card game and given a pre-test to ensure they could identify
all four colours, shapes, and numbers using the four-target cards (point to the ____). The four-
target cards were removed, the two-target cards were introduced and participants were told
how to play the game. The complete script of instructions is provided in S2 File. The test cards
were presented to participants one at a time, and participants placed the cards face down in
front of the appropriate target card. The test cards could be matched to the target cards on col-
our, shape, or number. For example, a test card featuring a single green square can be matched
Table 1. SCQ scores, WASI raw scores, IQ, Age, and mental age estimates for participants with and without autism. No differences were found between conditions.
Cohen’s d values are provided for the main effect of group.
Non-autism autism
(n = 45) (n = 38)
Mean SE Min Max Mean SE Min Max Cohen’s d
Social Communication Questionnaire†� Implicit 6.69 1.60 1 20 17.46 1.60 11 27
Explicit 7.13 1.49 2 21 20.4 1.82 12 32
Combined 6.92 1.01 18.73 1.27 2.05
WASI Vocabulary� Implicit 25.5 2.24 8 46 19.87 2.52 1 47
Explicit 23.94 2.52 0 42 16.9 2.52 0 37
Combined 24.37 1.53 18.38 1.95 0.54
WASI Blocks Implicit 10.75 3.09 0 44 19.18 3.48 0 65
Explicit 9.26 3.48 1 19 15.1 3.48 0 65
Combined 9.89 1.34 17.14 3.20 0.47
WASI Similarities� Implicit 14.67 1.67 1 29 11.06 1.88 0 31
Explicit 15.32 1.88 3 27 9.82 1.88 0 27
Combined 14.95 1.08 10.43 1.47 0.55
WASI Matrix Reasoning Implicit 13.33 1.64 0 27 13.34 1.84 1 29
Explicit 12.74 1.84 2 22 12.16 1.84 2 27
Combined 13.07 1.13 12.75 1.38 0.04
VIQ� Implicit 88.2 2.93 55 113 64.95 3.36 55 99
Explicit 84.4 3.27 50 107 65.11 3.36 53 88
Combined 86.51 2.41 65.02 1.98 1.5
PIQ� Implicit 89.04 3.72 53 124 77.16 4.27 55 126
Explicit 86.8 4.16 61 109 76.37 4.27 54 120
Combined 88.04 2.63 76.76 3.12 0.61
Full Scale IQ� Implicit 87.56 3.17 50 115 68.37 3.64 52 108
Explicit 84.25 3.55 55 104 68.16 3.64 50 101
Combined 86.09 2.54 68.26 2.27 1.14
Chronological Age� Implicit 9.6 0.44 6.5 15.42 13.06 0.5 9.92 16.33
Explicit 9.4 0.49 6.5 13.75 12.21 0.5 8.92 15.5
Combined 9.51 0.34 12.64 0.32 1.45
Verbal Mental Age Estimate Implicit 8.19 0.35 5.33 12.25 8.46 0.4 5.96 13.53
Explicit 7.78 0.39 5.27 11.15 7.91 0.4 5.08 11.32
Combined 8.01 0.24 8.19 0.30 0.1
Performance Mental Age Estimate� Implicit 8.23 0.46 5.4 12.3 10.09 0.53 6.27 15.86
Explicit 7.98 0.51 5.33 10.86 9.35 0.53 6.18 15.79
Combined 8.12 0.23 9.72 0.48 0.68
†62% of parents returned the SCQ.
�Main effect of group p < .05. No effects of condition or interactions between group and condition were found for any variables.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.t001
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to the two yellow squares if the rule is “match to shape,” to the three green circles if the rule is
“match to colour,” or to the single red star if the rule is “match to number.” All participants
started with the two-target level. Rules changed after participants made 10 consecutive correct
responses. If participants were unable to achieve 10 consecutive correct responses in 24 trials,
the task was terminated, and the number of successfully completed sets was recorded. Partici-
pants completed a maximum of 8 sets, using each sorting rule once per level. The presentation
order of the sorting rules was counterbalanced for the two-target level, and randomly gener-
ated for the three and four-target levels. Efforts were made to match the intonation and length
of the instruction given to the participants in the two conditions. In the Explicit condition,
participants were told: “put this with the same _____” before placing each test card. In the
Implicit condition participants were told “yes that is right / no that is wrong” after placing
each test card. If participants hesitated and looked to the experimenter for guidance, they were
prompted, “where does this one go?” When the participants had completed the task, or the
task was terminated, they were praised for their performance and debriefed.
Results
Data analyses
Testing yielded 5 dependent measures of performance on the two conditions of the task. These
included (a) number of sets completed, with possible scores between 0 and 8, (b) number of
trials to complete first set, (c) average number of trials per set, (d) number of errors, and (e)
average run length, meaning the number of consecutive trials using the same rule regardless of
whether correct. Participants were rank-ordered on each of the five dependent measures and
Fig 1. Example of two-target condition. The test card, a yellow star, is matched to the yellow square when the sorting
rule is colour, and to the red star when the sorting rule is shape.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.g001
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those ranks were summed to create a composite score entitled simple performance. For the
purposes of rank ordering, average run length was recalculated as the absolute value of 10
minus the average run length, such that better performance indicated runs closer to 10 and
worse performance indicated runs deviating from 10, high or low. For the ranked variables,
higher ranks indicated better performance, thus higher summed ranks indicated better overall
performance.
Errors were also broken down into perseverative, committing the same error twice, failure
to maintain set (FMS), committing an error following a string of two or more correct
responses, and random, which included all other errors not classified as perseverative or FMS.
Where appropriate, we used parametric statistical tests. Measures on ordinal scales were ana-
lysed using non-parametric tests (Spearman correlations & Mann-Whiney U tests).
A large sample of typically developing children were tested on the experimental task from
which participants were selected to developmentally match the participants with autism on the
basis of WASI performance as estimates of cognitive developmental attainment. We first
examined performance on our task developmentally in our typically developing sample, and
then examined performance in autism relative to the comparison sample. Finally, we con-
ducted exploratory analyses to shed light on the performance of children with autism.
Developmental analysis with typically developing sample
Initially we examined performance of the 80 typically developing children on the task. The par-
ticipants were grouped according to age (6–8 year olds, n = 38, & 9–11 year olds, n = 42), and
simple performance was analyzed using a 2 (age group) x 2 (condition) ANOVA. A significant
Fig 2. Example of three and four-target condition. Both the three and four-target levels included three possible sorting rules: colour,
shape, or number. The three-target condition contained the one red star, two yellow squares, and three green circles. The four-target
condition contained these same three targets plus the four blue triangles. The one green square test card can be matched to the two
yellow squares when the rule is shape, to the three green circles when the rule is colour, and to the one red star when the rule is number.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.g002
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main effect of condition, F (1,75) = 140.00, p< .001, partial η2 = .651, confirmed that perfor-
mance was better in the Explicit condition (M = 276.16, SEM = 9.23) than the Implicit condi-
tion (M = 125.53, SEM = 9.31). There were no effects of age group.
A Pearson correlation was used to examine age-related improvements in simple perfor-
mance. As these correlation analyses were exploratory, the p-values presented were not cor-
rected for multiple comparisons. There was no evidence of association between age and simple
performance in the Explicit condition, r(38) = -.03, but there was a moderate positive associa-
tion in the Implicit condition, r(38) = .41, p = .009. Spearman correlations between age and
each of the individual dependent measures were calculated separately for each condition. In
the Explicit condition, age negatively correlated with average trials per set, ρ(38) = -.34, p = .03,
and positively correlated with average run length, ρ(38) = .40, p = .01. In the Implicit condi-
tion, age positively correlated with the number of trials to complete the first set, ρ(38) = .36,
p = .022, the proportion of errors classified as FMS, ρ(37) = .42, p = .007, but negatively corre-
lated with the proportion of random errors, ρ(37) = -.35, p = .028.
There were too few errors committed to statistically analyze by type. In the Explicit condi-
tion, younger children committed an average of 2.8 errors and older children committed an
average of 0.7 errors; for both age groups the errors were predominantly FMS errors. In the
Implicit condition (mean total errors 9.1 & 8.7), younger children committed disproportion-
ately more random errors than perseverative or FMS errors, whereas older children committed
disproportionately fewer random errors than perseverative or FMS (Table 2). The majority of
children in the Explicit condition (all except one younger child) were at ceiling in sets com-
pleted and trials to first set. The number of children achieving ceiling performance in the
Implicit condition was much lower, with 30% of younger children and 55% of older children
completing all eight sets. Thus, the lack of age-related improvement seen in the Explicit condi-
tion is due to near ceiling performance achieved by even the youngest participants, confirming
that indeed the Explicit condition is easier.
Autism vs. comparison group
Simple performance was analyzed using a 2 (group) x 2 (condition) ANCOVA with WASI
vocabulary and similarities raw scores as covariates. A significant main effect of group, F(1,75) =
9.11, p = .003, partial η2 = .108, confirmed better overall performance by children without
Table 2. Error breakdown among typically developing sample. Errors were classified as perseverative, failure to maintain set (FMS), or random. Proportions are based
on a very small number of errors committed and thus not analyzed and are included only for descriptive purposes. Proportions were calculated for each participant before
aggregation, and thus do not sum to 1.0 (100%).
Condition Age Group Type of Error Mean Proportion SE
Implicit Younger Perseverative .271 .043
FMS .225 .076
Random .455 .056
Older Perseverative .321 .044
FMS .351 .078
Random .275 .057
Explicit Younger Perseverative .094 .045
FMS .471 .080
Random .046 .059
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autism. A significant main effect of condition, F(1,75) = 34.06, p< .001, partial η2 = .312, con-
firmed better overall performance in the Explicit condition. A significant interaction, F(1,75) =
7.84, p = .007, partial η2 = .095, showed that while children in both groups performed better in
the Explicit condition, this effect was considerably stronger among children without autism (Fig
3). Further, simple effects tests demonstrated that while there was a significant effect of group in
the Explicit condition, F(1,75) = 15.89, p< .001, partial η2 = .175, there was no evidence for dif-
ference in overall performance of the two groups in the Implicit condition (p>.8).
Exploratory follow-up analyses
While the hypothesized predictions of a main effect of group and main effect of condition
were supported, the pattern of data evident in the interaction inspired further exploratory
analyses. These analyses were meant to better understand the performance of children with
autism, given the concurrent finding that among a typically developing sample, the Explicit
condition is easier, more errors were committed in the Implicit condition, and the type of
errors would be expected to differ by condition. In the Explicit condition, errors would be
expected to be predominantly of the FMS type, whereas in the Implicit condition, error pat-
terns are more difficult to predict. We performed exploratory analyses on the different metrics
of performance, as well as on error patterns.
First, we examined the raw scores on the four non-error metrics that were used to create
the simple performance scores. Table 3 provides mean scores for each of these recorded
Fig 3. Simple performance composite scores by group and condition with verbal subtest scores covaried. A significant interaction was found. Simple
effects tests confirmed a significant effect of group in the Explicit condition but there was no evidence of difference between groups in the Implicit condition.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.g003
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aspects of performance. The data were not normally distributed, and Mann-Whitney U tests
were used to test for differences between groups within each condition separately and a Bon-
ferroni correction applied for multiple comparisons (0.05/8 = 0.00625). This analysis was pro-
vided for descriptive purposes, to understand which aspects of performance may have
contributed to the overall performance difference between groups. As there was no simple per-
formance difference between groups on the Implicit condition, not surprisingly there was no
difference between groups found for any of the individual aspects of performance. On the
Explicit condition, the children with autism completed fewer sets (U = 92, p = .005); no other
comparisons were significant after Bonferroni correction was applied.
In the next set of exploratory analyses, we examined error patterns. Table 4 shows the total
errors, average errors per completed set, and types of errors committed by group and condi-
tion. Visual inspection of this data suggests that children with autism committed a high pro-
portion of perseverative errors.
The total error and average errors were analysed using ANCOVA with WASI vocabulary
and similarities scores as covariates. For total errors, significant main effects of both group, F
(1,73) = 13.55, p< .001, and condition, F(1,73) = 14.17, p< .001, were found, as well as a sig-
nificant interaction, F(1,73) = 4.96, p = .029. For average errors per completed set, significant
main effects of both group, F(1,73) = 5.58, p = .021, and condition, F(1,73) = 5.45, p = .022,
were found, as well as a significant interaction, F(1,73) = 5.67, p = .02. In both cases, the inter-
action is driven by lower error rates for children without autism in the Explicit condition.
Overall accuracy (inverse of error rate as a function of total trials administered) and the
proportions of each error type were analyzed using logit model analysis with group and condi-
tion as fixed factors and WASI vocabulary and similarities raw scores as covariates. According
to Jaeger [38] this method is preferred over arcsine transformations for analyzing proportions.
Table 3. Raw scores on measures of performance. Mann-Whitney U tests were used to test for differences between groups within each condition separately. Group dif-
ferences were found only on the Explicit and not on the Implicit condition. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Asterisks (�) denote significant
differences between groups at p< .00625.
Non-autism (n = 25) autism (n = 19) Non-autism (n = 20) autism (n = 19)
Implicit Implicit U Explicit Explicit U
Sets completed 3.6 (3.25) 2.89 (2.71) 217.5 7.00 (2.45)� 3.53 (3.53)� 92.0
Trials to first set 13.56 (5.41) 15.22 (6.07) 213.0 10.55 (1.88) 12.28 (4.30) 137.0
Average trials per set 16.91 (4.13) 17.97 (3.82) 165.0 11.70 (2.5) 15.61 (4.36) 89.0
Average run length 7.04 (4.14) 7.23 (3.81) 211.0 9.59 (2.47) 17.38 (11.43) 122.0
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.t003
Table 4. Error patterns for children with and without autism. Total error counts, average errors per completed set, overall accuracy (proportion of all administered tri-
als), as well as proportions of errors classified as perseverative, FMS, or random are provided. Proportions were calculated for each participant before aggregation, and thus
may not sum to 1.0 (100%).
non-autism autism non-autism autism
Implicit Implicit Explicit Explicit
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Total errors 13.25 1.30 15.50 1.48 4.69 1.45 13.27 1.51
Average errors/ set 6.12 0.84 6.18 0.96 1.77 0.94 6.20 0.97
Overall accuracy 0.69 .038 .67 .04 .90 .04 .66 .04
Error Breakdown (proportion of total errors):
Perseverative 0.44 0.06 0.51 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.54 0.07
FMS 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.06
Random 0.37 0.05 0.29 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.06 0.06
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.t004
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For overall accuracy, main effects of both condition (Wald Z = -3.59, p< .01) and group
(Wald Z = 11.32, p< .001), as well as a significant interaction were found (Wald Z = -8.56, p<
.001); errors had an increased odds of 1.47 in the Implicit relative to the Explicit condition,
and had an increased odds of 5.05 times among children with autism relative to the children
without autism.
A three-factor Chi-squared test of independence was used to examine the distribution of
errors by type, χ2(7) = 234, p< .001. As seen in Table 4, perseverative errors were the most
prevalent type of error, with the exception of children without autism in the Explicit condition,
where the rate dropped by more than half. FMS errors occurred at a consistent rate across
group and condition (20–23%), and random errors occurred at a very low rate among children
with autism in the Explicit condition. Based on the pattern of errors, it appears that children
with and without autism were differentially affected by the experimental manipulation.
Subgroup analysis
Subgroup 1 –“switchers”. In an attempt to understand the error patterns further, we
examined switching by categorizing participants as switchers and non-switchers. We recoded
the number of categories completed. Children who completed 0 or 1 category were labeled
non-switchers, and those who scored 2–8 were labeled switchers. These non-switchers repre-
sent the most extreme inflexibility as they have failed the two-target level. In fact, the distribu-
tion of scores on the measure of total categories completed indicated that in the Explicit
condition, children either passed or failed–if they could make one rule switch, they made them
all. This was not the case in the Implicit condition, where all possible scores were represented
for number of categories completed. Children with autism were significantly less likely than
children without autism to switch rule sets altogether in the Explicit condition, (non-autism =
90% switched, autism = 42% switched), χ2 (1) = 10.01, p = .002, but not in the Implicit condi-
tion (non-autism = 64% switched, autism = 68% switched). Children classified as non-switch-
ers would have a high number of errors classified as perseverative because there is no
possibility of a random error on the two-target level and they did not make enough correct
answers to score a FMS error (if they failed to maintain their incorrect set, it would be marked
as correct). When we removed the “non-switchers” and re-examined the errors, main effects
of both condition (Wald Z = -7.91, p< .01) and group (Wald Z = 3.53, p < .001) remained
with no significant interaction; errors had an increased odds of 4.22 in the Implicit relative to
the Explicit condition, and had an increased odds of 2.14 among children with autism relative
to children without autism. The Chi-squared test for independence for the distribution of
errors by type was also significant (χ2(7) = 38.28, p< .001). Perseverative errors remained the
most frequent error type for autism, 69% and 50% in the Explicit and Implicit conditions
respectively (Table 5). Children without autism only committed more perseverative errors in
the Explicit condition, 39% and 35% in the Explicit and Implicit conditions respectively; in the
Implicit condition they committed more random errors (46%).
Table 5. Error breakdown (type of error as a proportion of all errors) and overall accuracy for “switchers” only.
Non-autism (n = 17) autism (n = 13) Non-autism (n = 18) autism (n = 8)
Implicit Implicit Explicit Explicit
Overall Accuracy 0.87 0.76 0.97 0.94
Perseverative 0.35 0.50 0.39 0.69
FMS 0.20 0.10 0.31 0.21
Random 0.46 0.40 0.31 0.10
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.t005
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We also re-examined simple performance in this subgroup of switchers and found only a
main effect of condition, F(1,48) = 56.49, p< .01, partial η2 = .541. Both groups performed bet-
ter in the Explicit condition than the Implicit condition, with gains of 103–114 points. Table 6
presents the means and standard deviations of each aspect of performance.
Subgroup 2 –non-switchers. Removing the non-switchers also resulted in severely unbal-
anced groups with sample sizes ranging from 8 to 18, and similar examinations of the non-
switchers (with sample sizes ranging from 2 to 11) failed Levene’s test of equality of error vari-
ances and could not be examined with ANOVA. Based on a visual examination of stem-and-
leaf plots, there did not appear to be any group or condition differences in simple performance
among the non-switchers. Descriptively, the non-switchers in both groups committed a higher
proportion of perseverative errors. This pattern was most pronounced in the Explicit condi-
tion, with perseverative errors accounting for 85% (non-autism) and 91% (autism) of errors.
Given that participants began with the two-target level and by definition the non-switchers did
not progress beyond that level, non-switchers had limited opportunity to commit non-persev-
erative errors.
The non-switchers’ performance was further examined for differences in passing or failing
the “pre-switch” of the two-target level. In the Explicit condition, 2/11 children with autism
failed pre-switch, compared to 0/2 children without autism. In the Implicit condition, 4/6 chil-
dren with autism failed pre-switch, compared to 5/8 children without autism. While these
numbers are not appropriate for analysis, it appears that most children with autism and all
children without autism could successfully sort one dimension to criterion in the Explicit con-
dition, but for both groups this was more challenging in the Implicit condition.
Predictive modeling of task performance
Rather than dismiss the non-switchers as failing the task, we used logistic regression to model
rule-switching. We initially tested a model that included Condition, however this factor was
not a significant predictor and data for the two conditions were considered together. We used
a forward conditional model and entered VIQ, PIQ, SCQ scores, and age as predictors; SCQ
scores were the only significant predictor (β = -0.14, p = .006) in the model, which correctly
classified 80.4% of participants, R2 = .25. We also used linear regression to model number of
categories completed and proportion of errors classified as perseverative separately with SCQ,
VIQ, PIQ, and age as predictors. Verbal IQ significantly predicted the total number of sets
completed (β = 0.09, p< .001, R2 = .23) with no significant contribution from the other predic-
tors, whereas VIQ significantly predicted the proportion of errors classified as perseverative (β
= -0.01, p< .001, R2 = .32) with an additional 6% of variance contributed by SCQ (β = 0.01, p =
.047). Thus, individuals with higher SCQ scores, regardless of IQ, were less likely to switch rule
sets; VIQ uniquely contributed to completing more sets but VIQ and SCQ together predicted
perseverative errors (Fig 4). As non-switchers score very low on total sets completed and very
high on perseverative errors, it appears these regression analyses are identifying the moderate
perseverators; participants who are not so symptomatic that they cannot switch, nevertheless
Table 6. Mean raw scores on measures of performance for “switchers” only. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Non-autism (n = 17) autism (n = 13) Non-autism (n = 18) autism (n = 8)
Implicit Implicit Explicit Explicit
Sets completed 4.94 (2.83) 4.08 (2.46) 7.67 (1.41) 7.25 (2.12)
Trials to first set 10.75 (.86) 12.75 (4.58) 10.44 (1.89) 10.63 (1.77)
Average trials per set 14.74 (2.10) 15.73 (1.81) 11.02 (1.46) 11.63 (2.13)
Average run length 7.13 (1.65) 6.87 (2.56) 9.28 (1.44) 9.45 (1.16)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.t006
Rule use in autism
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160 January 13, 2021 12 / 19
continue to be plagued by moderate perseveration. For these moderate perseverators, higher
VIQ and lower symptomology could be relevant to completing more sets and to resisting
perseveration.
Fig 4. Scatterplot of the relationship between proportion of perseverative errors and VIQ (top) and SCQ (bottom).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160.g004
Rule use in autism
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223160 January 13, 2021 13 / 19
Discussion
The WCST is a widely used test of cognitive flexibility and numerous studies find that perfor-
mance on the WCST, and cognitive flexibility in general, is a challenge in autism[2]. The aim
of this study was to examine cognitive inflexibility by manipulating the rule structure; we pre-
sented children with a card-sorting task that increased in the number of potential rules; in
addition, we randomly assigned children to one of two instruction conditions. The explicit
condition instructions were based on the pre-school DCCS, and the implicit condition instruc-
tions were based on the WCST. While children without autism performed better overall when
the rule structure was explicit than when rules had to be self-generated, the participants with
autism benefitted less. The participants with autism committed more errors on both condi-
tions, and both groups committed more perseverative errors when the rule structure was
explicit. More than half of participants with autism (58%) performed at a level consistent with
typically developing 3-year-olds[3, 4]. In contrast, only 10% of participants without autism
performed at this level. This was not seen in the Implicit condition, a finding that cannot be
explained with reference to chance differences in the basic ability level of different groups
given that participants were randomly assigned to conditions.
The finding of increased errors, and particularly increased perseverative errors among par-
ticipants with autism is consistent with previous research [2, 12–19]. The finding of enhanced
performance in the Explicit condition relative to the Implicit condition is not unexpected,
however performance of the participants with autism in the Explicit condition was surprising.
On examining the composite score of simple performance, which took into account five
measures of performance accuracy and efficiency, it seems the Explicit condition improved
card-sorting performance in both children with and without autism, although children with
autism did not demonstrate as large an improvement as children without autism. Hence, the
Explicit condition was easier.
For a subset of children with autism, the Explicit provision of rules appears to have
increased perseveration, and a large proportion of children with autism in this condition were
unable to switch sets even once. As participants were randomly assigned to and did not differ
on cognitive level between the two conditions, it seems the manipulation of task instructions
caused the increase in perseveration such that the number of children with autism completely
unable to switch nearly doubled, from 6/19 to 11/19.
One potential explanation is that the need to self-generate a sorting rule reduced the arbi-
trariness of the rules for children with autism. According to Russell and colleagues [39, 40],
cognitive flexibility is especially poor in autism when the rules appear arbitrary, for example
on the Windows Task, where children have to inhibit reaching directly into the box and
instead perform an arbitrary action in order to retrieve a candy. When the rules are logical,
children with autism perform better. In this task, because the feedback of the Implicit condi-
tion forced children to generate the rule, perhaps the rules effectively seemed less arbitrary
than when they were asserted by the experimenter.
While these findings were unexpected, there is reason to believe that typically developing
3-year-olds might perform similarly to the children with autism, despite our findings that the
Explicit condition was much easier among typically developing children aged 6 years and
older. Like children with autism, typically developing 3-year-olds struggle with cognitive flexi-
bility. Among 3-year-olds, feedback is reported to improve the ability to inhibit pre-potent
responses on both the Windows task [41] and the Marbles task [42]. Feedback also improved
performance among typically developing children when coupled with Explicit instruction on
the DCCS [43]. A meta-analysis of DCCS performance in 3-year-olds found the most support
for inhibitory control models of performance [3]; a given sorting rule has been activated, and
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owing to age-related immaturity of neural development, the 3-year-old cannot inhibit rule A
in favour of conflicting rule B. Future studies will be needed to examine how typically develop-
ing children 3 year olds would perform on this task. We did not include pre-schoolers in this
study as the children with autism in our sample were of school-age and ability. We also did not
include a third condition in which participants with autism were presented with both the
Explicit instruction and given corrective feedback. Like typically developing 3-year-olds, we
might expect such a condition to enhance performance for participants with autism.
While 45% of participants with autism were “non-switchers,” amongst the switchers, the
Explicit condition improved performance on card-sorting. When the non-switchers were
removed, the group differences on the Explicit condition disappeared and both groups evi-
denced improved performance and decreased perseveration in the Explicit condition, although
children with autism continued to commit more errors and disproportionately more persever-
ative errors than children without autism. Thus, the explicit provision of rules influenced per-
formance differently, depending on whether children with autism could be classified as non-
switchers or switchers. This classification was predicted by severity of autism symptoms, not
general measures of IQ, while verbal IQ helped predict perseveration rates, which remained
elevated among switchers as well. The importance of symptomology as a predictor may shed
light on issues of heterogeneity reported in the literature; non-switchers had higher SCQ scores
than switchers. Landry and Al-Taie [2] examined predictors of WCST performance and found
symptomology (ADI scores) was associated with perseveration, however chronological age
was a confound in this relationship. Further, they found performance IQ, not verbal IQ, was
associated with perseveration; verbal IQ predicted non-perseverative errors.
Our regression modeling indicated that SCQ scores, a measure of symptomology, predicted
which children would and would not switch sets and neither VIQ nor PIQ contributed addi-
tionally to the model. This suggests cognitive inflexibility is intimately associated with the out-
wardly visible symptoms of autism; the more “autistic-like” behaviours reported by parents,
the less likely they were to switch sets. This was also seen in the children without autism who
were excluded on the basis of excessively high SCQ, all of whom failed to switch. While it
might be tempting to take this as evidence that the social nature of the task administration cre-
ates a disadvantage for participants with autism, the notion that individuals with autism per-
form better on computerized versions of the same task has been disputed [2].
Limitations and future directions
We did not in this study examine the psychometric properties of our task. This task was
designed as an experimental manipulation, and is only intended for between condition and
between group comparisons. Further research examining the relationship between this task and
other executive function tasks, both lab-based and “real-world” would be needed before any
assertions about clinical evaluation of executive function could be made. We did not record the
gender of our participants at the time of testing, and thus we are unable to examine whether
there were any gender differences within and across groups on this task. We also did not collect
any measure of working memory, and thus are unable to assess the degree to which individual
differences in verbal working memory may impact on task performance in the two conditions.
We recruited and tested our participants within the school setting. We are confident in the
diagnostic classifications and parent/teacher confirmation that no participants were diagnosed
with ADHD. The SCQ is a screening measure, not a diagnostic measure. We are confident in
the diagnostic classification of our participants with and without autism and chose the SCQ to
give an indication of symptomology that would have enough variability in both groups to be a
useful measure. Diagnostic tests such as the ADOS [44] or ADI [37], while rigorous for clinical
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purposes, do not give a very wide range of scores and do not capture variability within or out-
side the autism spectrum. Future studies should examine relationships between cognitive flexi-
bility and other continuous measures of symptomology such as the Social Responsiveness
Scale [45], which offers a continuum of scores on an even larger scale, and capacity to examine
as a function of subscales relevant to the autism spectrum.
Our autism and non-autism groups differed significantly on chronological age, however
they were matched for developmental level, not chronological age. As highlighted by Burack
et al. [46], “no choice of comparison group or matching strategy is perfect, but rather needs to
be determined by specific research objectives and theoretical questions” (p. 65). In this study,
we based our matching strategy on the rationale that verbal skill development is relevant to
performance on the experimental task, as described in the Introduction. The participants with
autism as a group were older than the non-autism group, yet this afforded them no advantage
as seen in their performance. For a more detailed discussion of issues in matching strategies,
please see [46, 47].
Many behaviours characteristic of autism vary within the normal population; the robust
relationship between SCQ and switching suggests cognitive flexibility may be one such behav-
iour. While SCQ was a robust predictor of switching, participants were randomly assigned to
the Explicit and Implicit conditions, and there was no evidence to suggest SCQ scores differed
(p> .8) between conditions, yet children with autism in the Explicit condition were more
likely to be non-switchers and perseverated more. We analysed the performance of all partici-
pants, regardless of switching status. The rationale for this decision is that we were interested
in many aspects of performance, not just switching. Oftentimes we discard participants who
are unable to perform a task. Sometimes this is legitimate, but when a substantial number of
participants fail, and they are disproportionately in one condition, this warrants investigation.
Why did more than half of children with autism effectively fail the Explicit condition, when
only 10% of the children without autism failed, and only 1/3 of both groups failed in the harder
Implicit condition? Further research is needed to examine why the Explicit instructions were
so handicapping to the children with autism, and how symptom severity relates to that effect.
Should these findings be replicated using a within-subjects design, we would have even more
compelling evidence that the instruction alone could have such a detrimental effect on flexibil-
ity. Presenting the two conditions to the same group of participants carries a unique set of
challenges. Presumably there would be carry-over effects, which might differ between children
with autism and a comparison group, further muddying interpretation.
In conclusion, we replicated the finding of increased perseveration among participants with
autism, and found the experimental manipulation differentially affected participants with and
without autism. What are the possible explanations? We reject the notion that cognitive flexi-
bility can account for the differential performance on the Explicit condition because cognitive
flexibility demands were equal in the Implicit condition. We can also reject a working memory
explanation because working memory demands would be higher in the Implicit condition.
The two experimental conditions differed in instructions and in the feedback provided. When
children with autism were provided with explicit sorting instruction and no corrective feed-
back, 42% of children were successful at switching sorting rules. When children with autism
were not provided with the sorting rule and had to work it out on the basis of corrective feed-
back, 68% were successful at switching sorting rules. We can only speculate as to how correc-
tive feedback would have impacted performance in the Explicit condition, as this has been
shown to improve performance for typically developing children on the DCCS, however the
original DCCS does not include corrective feedback for children. The differential performance
of children with autism on our condition inspired by the DCCS and our condition inspired by
the WCST suggests that the tasks are less analogous than previously thought.
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